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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
No. 09-3405 
___________ 
 
CARLOS IVAN LOJA, 
                  Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
                             Respondent 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A97-445-094) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Eugene Pugliese 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 20, 2010 
 Before:  SLOVITER, CHAGARES and WEIS, Circuit 
                                  
Judges 
 Opinion filed: October 26, 2010               
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION 
 ___________ 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 Carlos Ivan Loja, a native and citizen of Ecuador, entered the United States 
in September 1995.  In 2006, Loja was charged with removability pursuant to 
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) § 212(a)(6)(A)(i) [8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i)] 
(present without being admitted or paroled).  Loja conceded that he was removable, but 
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applied for cancellation of removal under INA § 240A [8 U.S.C. § 1229b], contending 
that his removal would cause an exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his 
United States citizen children, Erica (born in 2001) and Brenda (born in 2004).  
 Loja claimed that Erica was born with a hole in her heart, which was 
surgically repaired when she was six months old.  Although the doctor advised that 
Erica’s condition would need to be monitored, she had not been examined with regard to 
her heart problem since she was eight months old.  Loja stated that Erica has not had 
further problems with her heart, but that sometimes she “feels very tired” after playing.  
Erica also began having dental problems when she was between four and five years old.  
The most extensive treatment, including “filling in” Erica’s teeth and a root canal, began 
about three months prior to the hearing.  Loja’s other daughter, Brenda, had to have 
dental care as well because one of her teeth was “darkened all around.”  
 One week before Loja’s scheduled hearing before an Immigration Judge 
(“IJ”), Loja’s attorney attempted to submit a witness list and documentary evidence, 
including dental records which described Erica’s treatment.  The IJ refused to admit the 
evidence because it was not submitted within 10 days of the hearing.  See 8 C.F.R. § 
1003.31(c) (authorizing IJs to set filing deadlines and to deem opportunity to file 
applications and related documents abandoned when deadlines not met).  The IJ noted 
that the hearing had been adjourned previously so that evidence about Erica’s dental 
treatment could be gathered.  In addition, the IJ decided not to wait to take telephonic 
testimony from the dentist, whose name was on the late-filed witness list and who was 
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with a patient when the IJ called.   
 The IJ denied relief, concluding that although Loja was otherwise qualified 
for cancellation, “[t]he degree of hardship [here] . . . is not a degree of hardship that 
would surprise anyone as being unique or unusual in this Court’s view.”  Loja appealed 
to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), arguing that the IJ failed to fully consider 
and properly weigh the evidence and that the IJ improperly excluded documentary 
evidence and testimony, “interjected his own medical opinion,” and was biased.  The BIA 
rejected these contentions.  It concluded that the IJ had specifically considered the 
relevant hardship factors (including the children’s medical conditions), that the IJ did not 
abuse his discretion in enforcing a filing deadline or refusing to hear the dentist’s 
telephonic testimony, that the IJ’s assessment of the children’s medical condition was not 
a medical finding, and the record did not support Loja’s claim that the IJ was biased, 
abandoned his neutrality, or acted as an advocate.  Loja filed a timely petition for review.   
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to INA § 242.1
                                                 
1 The Government filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that INA  
§ 242(a)(2)(B)(i) [8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)] removes our jurisdiction  
over the Board’s discretionary decision regarding the hardship  
determination under INA § 240A.  To obtain cancellation of removal, an  
applicant must show, among other things, that removing him would cause  
exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his spouse, child, or parent  
who is a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident.  See INA §  
240A(b)(1)(A)-(D).  In this case, the IJ found that Loja did not demonstrate  
such hardship, and the Government correctly argues that we do not have  
jurisdiction to review that determination.  See INA § 242(a)(2)(B);  
Mendez-Moranchel v. Ashcroft, 338 F.3d 176, 179 (3d Cir. 2003).  We  
nevertheless retain jurisdiction to review constitutional claims or questions  
  “[W]hen the BIA both 
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adopts the findings of the IJ and discusses some of the bases for the IJ’s decision, [this 
Court has] authority to review the decisions of both the IJ and the BIA.”  Chen v. 
Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 215, 222 (3d Cir. 2004).  The decision to exclude evidence for failure 
to meet a filing deadline is reviewed for abuse of discretion.  See Dedji v. Mukasey
 Loja argues that he “was deprived of his right to a full and fair hearing, 
particularly his right to present the best evidence he had regarding his child’s unusually 
severe dental problems and ongoing treatment, and, without this evidence of hardship, his 
case was deeply prejudiced and [he] was denied due process of law.”  Pet’r’s Br., 14.  
Due process requires that an alien be provided with a full and fair hearing and a 
reasonable opportunity to present evidence.  
, 525 
F.3d 187, 191-92 (2d Cir. 2008).  
See Romanishyn v. Att’y Gen., 455 F.3d 
175, 185 (3d Cir. 2006); see also INA § 240(b)(4)(B) [8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(B)] 
(providing that an “alien shall have a reasonable opportunity . . . to present evidence on 
the alien’s own behalf.”).  An IJ has discretion to set deadlines for the submission of 
documents.  See
                                                                                                                                                             
of law raised in a petition for review.  See INA § 242(a)(2)(D); Mendez- 
Reyes v. Att’y Gen., 428 F.3d 187, 189 (3d Cir. 2005).  Here, Loja presents  
a question of law in arguing  that the IJ violated his due process rights by  
denying his request to admit  late-filed documentary evidence and by  
refusing to wait for the dentist’s telephonic testimony.  Therefore, we will  
deny the Government’s motion to dismiss. 
 8 C.F.R. § 1003.31(c) (“The Immigration Judge may set and extend time 
limits for the filing of applications and related documents.”).  When a document has been 
deemed untimely filed, the “opportunity to file that . . . document shall be deemed 
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waived.”  Id.  Notably, however, “it is a matter of concern when an IJ’s strict adherence 
to the established time limit prevents a petitioner from presenting his case.”  Dedji, 525 
F.3d at 192 (citing  Galicia v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 529, 539 (7th Cir. 2005)).  Thus, 
“where an alien has demonstrated good cause for the failure to timely file documents and 
a likelihood of substantial prejudice from enforcement of the deadline, an IJ may, in the 
exercise of his informed discretion, depart from the deadline imposed by the relevant 
local rules.”  
 We conclude that no abuse of discretion occurred here because Loja has not 
demonstrated good cause for failing to timely submit the evidence.  Loja does not 
contend that the documents he sought to have admitted were unavailable in advance of 
the filing deadline.  
Id. 
 On September 28, 2007, Loja’s attorney filed a motion to adjourn a merits 
hearing that was scheduled for October 9, 2007, asserting that she needed more time to 
submit documents supporting the “extensive dental treatment” that Erica was undergoing.  
The IJ granted that motion and a hearing was scheduled for July 3, 2008.  Seven days 
before that date, however, Loja’s attorney submitted a Motion to Accept Late-Filed 
Evidence.  Along with the motion, Loja’s attorney provided the witness list and 
documentary evidence, including an undated letter and a June 3, 2008, email from Erica’s 
dentist.  The IJ denied the Motion and refused to admit the proffered documents into 
evidence, marking them for identification purposes only.   
See Hassan v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d 429 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that 
there was not good cause for failing to comply with filing deadline where alien “had 
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more than eight months since he first filed his asylum application to procure” relevant 
letter).  Moreover, there is no claim that Erica’s dental problems became significantly 
worse during the 10 days prior to the hearing.  Cf. Dedji, 525 F.3d at 192-93 (finding 
abuse of discretion in IJ’s refusal to consider corroborative evidence, where the 
attorney’s failure to timely submit the documents was the result of a fire at her office).   
 In addition, we discern no abuse of discretion in the IJ’s refusal at the 
hearing to continue to wait on the telephone for the dentist to become available.  The 
dentist’s name was on the witness list submitted after the filing deadline.  Nevertheless, 
the IJ did attempt to contact the dentist by telephone.  The IJ waited on hold until a 
receptionist came on the line and stated that the dentist was with a patient.  The IJ then 
waited on hold “several minutes” before rendering the oral decision.  We conclude that 
this was not improper  Cf. Ponce-Leiva v. Ashcroft
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny Loja’s petition for review.
, 331 F.3d 369, 377 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(holding that an IJ has wide discretion to grant or deny a request for a continuance).  
2
                                                 
2 The Government’s motion to dismiss is denied. 
 
 
   
